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THE GENERAL CONFERENCE FOR THE REVIEW OF
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
K. KRISHNA RAO*

7HhOMAS JEFFERSON has said:

...

laws and institutions must go

hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.... As new dis-

coveries are made, new truths disclosed and manners and opinions change
with the advance of circumstances, institutions must advance also and keep
pace with the times. .

.

. Each generation has a right to choose for itself

the form of government the most promotive of its own happiness."' The
constitution of the United Nations, namely, the Charter, makes provision
for the review and adoption of amendments to its provisions. In accordance with Article 109 of the Charter, the General Assembly of the United
Nations during its current session will consider the desirability of convening a general conference of Member nations to review the present Charter.
The authors of the Charter included provisions similar to those to be
found in a "rigid" national constitution requiring a special process to
amend the constitution, rather than an amendment by the ordinary legislative process. Article 108 of the Charter lays down the procedure for
amendments; their adoption is possible by a vote of two-thirds of the
members of the General Assembly and ratification in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of
the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security
Council. Under Article 109, a general conference convoked for the purpose of reviewing the Charter by a two-thirds vote of the members of the
General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security
Council should recommend any alterations by a two-thirds vote of the
conference. If no general conference is summoned before the tenth session
of the Assembly, that session of the Assembly should consider the desirability of holding one and a simple majority both in the Assembly and any
seven members of the Security Council would be sufficient for a decision
in the matter.
I.

TE SAN FRANcisco CONFERENCE 1945

Chapter XVIII of the Charter, containing Articles 108 and 109, had
its origin in Chapter XI of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which provided
that the amendments should come into force for all Members of the
Organization if adopted by two-thirds of the members of the Assembly
* Member of the Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations. Any opinions expressed In this
article, unless otherwise indicated, are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
those of the Organization with which he is associated.
1. Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 674-75 (Koch & Peelan).

1955]

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

and ratified by all the permanent members of the Security Council and by
a majority of the other Members of the Organization.2 The four sponsoring governments (United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and
China) suggested at San Francisco Conference two additional paragraphs.
The first paragraph provided that the present Charter would come into
force after ratification by the permanent members of the Security Council
and by a majority of the other Members of the Organization. The second
paragraph made provision for a general conference of the Member of the
Organization to be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds
vote of the General Assembly with the concurrence of a majority of the
Security Council members for the purpose of reviewing the Charter and
that each Member shall have one vote in the Conference. Any alterations
of the Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the Conference shall
take effect when ratified by the permanent members of the Security Council and by a majority of the other Members of the Organization.3
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as amended by the sponsoring governments were taken up for discussion in Committee I/2' of the San Francisco
Conference. After the delegate of Uruguay stated his opposition to the
requirement in the amendment process for the unanimity of the Members
having permanent seats on the Security Council, the British delegate
replied that the so-called veto of the permanent members of the Security
Council would not be involved in the future calling of the Conference. He
stated that the holding of a general conference would focus the public
opinion of all Member States on the issue of the proposed amendment.
He further expressed his belief that ". . an amendment carried by a
two-thirds majority of this general conference would be likely to find general agreement including that of members of the Security Council."' It
may be argued that the British delegate is implying the existence of a
moral obligation on the part of the permanent Members to accept amendments approved by a two-thirds vote in the Conference.
The Australian delegate after stating that the proposals of the sponsoring governments, if adopted, would make amendments impossible and that
the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were more liberal in this
respect proposed, in view of the importance, the appointment of a special
sub-committee to consider the question and report to the full committee.
He expressed his belief that the Yalta formula dealt with the exercise of
the veto during the currency of the Charter while it did not address itself
to amendments of the Charter. The delegate of Chile proposed that on
expiration of the period of one year Members who have not communicated
2.
3.
4.
5.

Wi). 2, 1/2/25, 7 U.N. Conf. Intl Org. Docs. 519 (1945).
Doc. No. 1, G1l, 3 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 7-8 (1945).
Doc. No. 648, 1/2/46, 7 U.N. Conf. Intl Org. Docs. 144 (1945).
Id. at 145.
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their ratification to the Organization would be considered to have ratified
the Charter.'
At the next meeting of the Committee, several delegates emphasized
that, if the veto applied to amendments, it would be necessary to differentiate between amendments on purposes and principles of the Organization
and the rules governing the action of the Security Council, and other
matters not affecting the special responsibilities of the permanent members
of the Security Council. It was explained by several delegates, opposed
to the amending procedure suggested in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
and modified by the amendment of the sponsoring governments, that the
latter amending procedure was too inflexible. It was pointed out that any
one of the permanent members of the Council acting alone would be able
to prevent revision of the Charter. Several of the delegates argued on
behalf of the qualified majority for ratification. Some delegates stated
their preference for a periodic review of the Charter, while some others
felt that the Assembly could serve adequately as a public forum for the
preliminary discussion of amendments.
A special Sub-Committee, appointed for the purpose of studying the
matter in detail, reported 8 to the Committee with six recommendations:'
(i) a provision in the Charter for a special conference to revise the Charter;
(ii) the special conference is to be called by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and of any seven members of the Security Council; 10

(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

the special conference should be called not sooner than the fifth and not later
than the tenth year after the coming into force of the Charter;
the Charter should provide that decisions of the special conference be taken by
a two-thirds vote;
any alterations recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference to take
effect when ratified by a majority of the Members of the Assembly and all the
permanent members of the Security Council;
with regard to regular amendments of the Charter, they are to come into force
when ratified by two-thirds of all Members including all of the permanent
members of the Security Council.

The full Committee discussed first, recommendation (iii) of the SubCommittee relating to the specific time-limit for calling a conference. The
delegations of the United States, the Soviet Union, Iran, Syria and Lebanon spoke in favour of omitting reference to a specific time-limit for calling
6. Id. at 146.
7. Doc. No. 683, 1/2/48, 7 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 154 (1945).
8. W.D. 344, I/2/E/2, 7 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Does. 573-75 (1945).
9. Doc. No. 991, 1/2/66, 7 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 209 (1945).
10. The sponsoring governments originally proposed a three-fourths vote of the General
Assembly for calling a special conference. The United States delegate stated that the sponsoring governments agreed to amend their proposal providing for a two-thirds instead of a
three-fourths vote of the Assembly and this modified proposal was adopted by the SubCommittee. See note 8 supra.
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a conference. The delegations of Australia, Canada, Peru and Belgium
supported the recommendation of the Sub-Committee. The delegate of
Uruguay believed it necessary to see how the veto power would be exercised and stated that such a revision conference would provide an opportunity for the members to denounce any country abusing the veto power.'
The Committee decided at its next meeting to consider the recommendation of the special Sub-Committee that the conference be called not sooner
than the fifth,2 nor later than the tenth year after the coming into force of
the Charter.1
After rejecting a South African proposal that a special conference should
be called not later than the tenth year of the coming into force of the
Charter, the committee considered the proposal that if a general conference has not been held before the tenth annual meeting of the Assembly
following the entry into force of the Charter, the proposal to call such a
conference shall be placed on the agenda of that meeting of the Assembly.
The United States delegate explained during the debate that the SecretaryGeneral would place the item on the agenda of the Assembly and the
Assembly would act in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the
Charter. On the other hand, the delegate from the Soviet Union considered
it a political error to mention in the Charter a specific time for calling the
revision conference and the delegate from New Zealand proposed an
amendment under which the general conference would be held unless the
General Assembly and the Security Council decide otherwise. The Committee decided to provide in the Charter for a special conference to revise
the Charter.13 It was decided that the special conference be called by twothirds vote of the General Assembly and of any seven members of the
Security Council.
With regard to the question of voting procedure at the special conference, the Australian delegation urged that the Committee should accept
the Mexican proposal to make no provision in the Charter with regard to
the voting procedures to be followed at this special conference or for the
ratification of amendments proposed by the conference. The Mexican
delegate himself declared that in making the recommendation his delegation was not taking a position either for or against the future of the veto.
However, in view of the opposition of the permanent members of the
Security Council to his proposal he withdrew it. He commented that
... to pretend that an amendment may come into force, notwithstand11. Doec. No. 991, 1/2/66, 7 U.N. Conf. Intl Org. Docs. 209, 211 (1945). It may be
pointed out here that this statement of the Uruguayan delegate formed the basis for the
rejection by the Soviet delegate to have a general conference to revise the Charter. See p. 360,
infra.
12. Doc. No. 1015, 1/2/68, 7 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 219 (1945).
13. Doc. No. 1022, 1/2/69, 7 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 229 (1945).
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ing the non-ratification by one or more of the permanent members of the
Security Council, would probably amount to forcing said members to
withdraw from the Organization, or in other words to pretend that the
Organization could fulfil its duties
without the cooperation of such states,
'14
which he considered impossible.

At the next meeting of the Committee, it is interesting to note that the
Chinese delegate' expressed the belief that "... those who pressed for
change of the procedure assumed too readily that the permanent members
of the Council would be at odds with the rest of the nations. His own view
was that the veto might prove much less important than expected and
might, in fact, never be used; he felt that it was not unreasonable to
suppose that after a time the great powers would be willing to consider
elimination of the veto"--a hope, which, as later events proved, never
materialized. The Committee finally approved the following text:
"Any alterations of the Charter recommended by two-thirds vote of the Conference
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes by two-thirds of the Members of the Organization including all of the
permanent Members of the Security Council."16
The United States delegate moved the adoption of the following
proposal:
"If such a general conference has not been held before the tenth annual meeting of
the Assembly following the entry into force of the Charter, the proposal to call such
a general conference shall be placed on the agenda of that meeting of the Assembly,
and the conference shall be held if so decided by a simple majority of the Assembly
and by any seven members of the Security Council."17
The delegates of Australia, New Zealand, Equador, the United Kingdom, Peru, Canada, France, Chile, Brazil, South Africa, China, Argentina
and Greece spoke in support of the proposal of the United States. The delegate of the Soviet Union announced his opposition to the proposal of the
United States. He stated that his delegation was opposed to facilitating
the convocation of such a conference for which there might be no need
in the future. He explained that his delegation supported the amendment
of the sponsoring governments on the revision conference but was opposed
to any easy procedure for calling such a conference. Another consideration for the Soviet opposition, the delegate of the Soviet Union pointed
out, was the desire expressed by many delegates to use such a conference
to destroy the veto power. He believed that such a conference would also
be used to threaten the unanimity of the big powers. The Committee
finally adopted the proposal of the United States. The final text for the
14. Doc. No. 1157, 1/2/79, 7 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 236-37 (1945).
15. Doc. No. 1053, 1/2/72, 7 U.N. Conf. Intl Org. Does. 241, 244 (1945).
16. Doc. No. 1052, 1/2/71, 7 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 249, 251 (1945).
17. Id. at 250.
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Special Conference on the Revision of the Charter, approved by the
Committee, has become, with minor drafting changes, Article 109 of the
present Charter.
At the same meeting the Committee adopted the recommendation of
the Sub-Committee that regular amendments come into force when ratified
by two-thirds of all Members including all of the permanent members of
the Security Council. The final text, approved by the Committee, was
included with some minor drafting changes, as Article 108 of the present
Charter.
It appears from the above study of the legislative history that the
delegations present at San Francisco in not wishing to leave the calling
of the general conference entirely to chance had included a suitable provision in Article 109, paragraph 3, of the Charter. The provision has been
a compromise between proposals without any specific time-limit for the
calling of a conference and those providing for a definite time. It also shows
that practically all delegations had attached a great importance to a
general conference which would review the Charter. It is significant that
although under Article 108 any amendment would not come into effect
unless ratified by all the permanent members of the Security Council, the
British delegate seemed to imply that if the General Assembly recommended an amendment by a two-thirds vote the permanent members would
not, in all likelihood, refuse to ratify it.
IL AcTuAL AMEND NTETS PiopOSED BY MmBER STATs
Proposals to amend the Charter or to convene a general conference
have been made as early as the first session of the General Assembly.
Member States made concrete proposals during the second and third
sessions of the Assembly. No further proposals have since been made.
Article 27 of the Charter governing the method of voting in the Security
Council (otherwise known as the veto question) became the centre of
controversy almost from the inception of the United Nations. During the
first session of the Assembly the Philippines submitted a proposal,18 which,
while recognizing that the stalemate in the Security Council regarding
many current and serious problems demanding swift and decisive action
was due to the existence of veto power in the Charter, will amend paragraph 3, Article 27 of the Charter. It would require that decisions on all
non-procedural matters be made by an affirmative vote of seven members,
including the concurring votes of at least three (and not five as provided
at present) permanent members. At the same session the delegation of
Cuba put forward a proposal to convene a general conference to review
the Charter. It proposed the appointment of a special committee of those
18. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1st Sess., pt. 2, First Committee, Annex 7a, at 323-24
(Doc. No. A/C.1/34) (1946).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

representatives of Member States, willing to serve, for the purpose of
considering and preparing a report to the General Assembly, concerning
amendments which would make the United Nations a more effective instrument to maintain world peace and security.19 The Philippines withdrew
its proposal in favour of the Cuban proposal, which, when put to vote, was
rejected, and the resolution actually adopted by the Assembly made no
mention of either a review conference or of an amendment of the Charter. 0
Another proposal submitted by Argentina to convene a general conference to amend Article 27 was considered by the First Committee of the
Assembly during the second session of the Assembly.2 1 The Conference
was to be convened for the "...
purpose of studying the privilege of the
veto . . . with a view to its abolition ... .
A proposal to refer to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly
the question of veto in the Security Council was adopted. 23 The Interim
Committee recommended that the Assembly should consider at its third
session ". . . whether the time has come or not to call a general conference. .... )24 At the third session of the Assembly, an Argentine proposal
to convene a general conference to consider the desirability of revising the
Charter was rejected. No proposals have since been made.
At this point it is relevant to note the views of important delegations at
the time of the opening of the tenth session of the Assembly. Only the
delegates of United States and Soviet Union have made statements on the
question of veto at the time of this writing. The Secretary of State, Mr.
Dulles, remarked that a review conference should be held and that
.. . one impelling reason would be to reconsider the present veto power
in relation to the admission of new members, particularly if that veto
power should continue to be abused."2' 5 On the other hand, Mr. Molotov,
the Foreign Minister of USSR expressed the opinion that, "The Charter,
as it stands today, meets in full the demands placed on it, provided the
States Members of the United Nations seek genuinely to promote international co-operation and security.
".. . Our aim should not be to break up the Charter but rather to achieve joint and
common action by States and, in particular, by the permanent members of the Security
19. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1st Sess., pt. 2, First Committee, Annex 7d, at
326-27 (Doec. No. A/C.1/58) (1946).
20. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1st Sess., pt. 2, First Committee, 283 at 292 (Dec.
No. A/C.1/130) (1946).
21. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1st Sess., pt. 2, Res. 40, at 64 (1946).
22. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 2d Sess., First Committee, Annex 2, at 529-30 (Dec.
No. A/351) (1947).
23.

Ibid.

24. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 3d Sess., Interim Committee, Supp. 10, at 17 (Dec.
No. A/578) (1948).
25. U.N. General Assembly Provisional Verbatim Rec., 10th Sess., at 13-15, A/PV. 518

(1955).
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Council. This is required in order to achieve success in the work of the United Nations
for the maintenance and consolidation of peace. In view of this, the Soviet Government deems it appropriate to state clearly that it is necessary, in conformity with the
Charter, to enhance the role of the Security Council in the United Nations, bearing
in mind the fact thatfor some time now the Council obviously has not been functioning
at full capacity and that it has often been by-passed in cases where it was precisely
the Cecurity Council that should have dealt with important matters relating to the
maintenance of peace."28

Another proposal for the amendment of the Charter related to the
question of the composition of the Economic and Social Council. Argentina submitted at the first session of the Assembly the item proposing that
".... the number of members of the Economic and Social Council stipulated in Article 61, paragraph 1, be increased to twenty-four (24)."'7 The
Argentine proposal to convene a general conference to review Article 61
of the Charter and to increase the number of members of the Economic
and Social Council was not put to vote. The Assembly adopted a resolution requesting Member States to 8communicate their suggestions on the
question to the Secretary-General.
It may be noted that opposition to convene a conference for the purpose
of amending the Charter made in the above proposal was due to the view
held by a majority of Member States that it was then too early to consider
amending the Charter and that the Charter should be given a period of
trial. As for the veto question, it was pointed out that difficulties have
arisen because of the peculiar political situation, which was existing at
the time and that amendment of the Charter would be no solution to the
problem.
I. PEPARATIONs FOR THE rEVIEw CONFERENCE
At the eighth session of the Assembly the delegates referred generally
to the question of a conference for the review of the Charter in their statements during the general debate in the plenary meetings. -9 In addition,
three separate items relating to the study of the Charter were placed on
the agenda of the eighth session at the request of Argentina, the Netherlands and Egypt respectively. Argentina proposed the publication of
documents concerning the legislative history and the practice followed
by the various organs of the United Nations in applying the Charter.?
26.

U.N. General Assembly Provisional Verbatim Rec., 10th Sess., at 77-80, A/PV. 520

(1955).
27. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1st Sess., pt. 2, General Committee, 82-83 (Doc. No.
A/BUR/48) (1946).
28. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 3d Sess., pt. 1, Res. 203, at 44 (1948).
29. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess., Plenary; U.S. p. 17, 20; Peru p. 65, 70;
Ecuador p. 99, 107; Syria p. 149, 150; Argentina p. 177, 178 (1953).

30. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 58, at 2-3 (Doc.
No. A/2415, Doc. No. A/2415/Add. 1) (1953).
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The Netherlands proposed preparatory work with regard to the possible
holding of a general conference in accordance with Article 109 of the
Charter.3 l The Egyptian proposal related to the election of a technical
committee to study and report on the amendment of the Charter on the
basis of proposals to be submitted by Member States. 2 Three different
views seem to have prevailed concerning the question of review of the
Charter at the General Assembly; some governments, like the United
States,' wished to implement the provisions of Articles 108 and 109 of
the Charter, some other governments, like the Soviet Union,3 4 did not see
any need to change the fundamental principles of the Charter and certain
other governments, among them India,8" took the position that greater
adherence to the Charter is needed more than the revision of the Charter
at the present time. These views have been reiterated by the respective
delegates in their statements made during the general debate of the tenth
session of the General Assembly. 8
A draft resolution by Argentina, Canada, Cuba, the Netherlands, New
Zealand and Pakistan, requested the Secretary-General to prepare and
publish a systematic compilation of documents of the San Francisco Con31. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 70, at 3 (Doc.
No. A/2442) (1953).
32. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 72, at 4 (Doc.
No. A/2466, Doc. No. A/2466/Add. 1) (1953).
33. The delegate of the United States: "Many nations, particularly the smaller nations,
objected strongly to what they thought was an excessive award of power to the permanent
members of the Security Council. They feared that the Security Council would prove unworkable because of disagreements among the Great Powers. Unhappily, these fears have In large
measure materialized. There were other provisions of the Charter which were adopted with
great reluctance and concern. It was possible to secure acceptance of the Charter at San
Francisco only by means of a provision assuring that there would be an opportunity to review
it in the light of experience. It is already apparent, after eight years, that this opportunity
should be grasped." U. N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess., Plenary 29 (1953).
34. The delegate of the Soviet Union: "The fact that the United States is not interested
in relaxing international tension is also clear from the part of Mr. Dulles' speech devoted to
the revision of the United Nations Charter or, rather, to propaganda to the effect that advantage should be taken of a revision of the Charter to do away with one of the fundamental
principles on which the United Nations is based, namely, the principle of the unanimity of
the permanent members in the consideration and solution of problems in the Security Council.
This principle ties the hands of those who wish to weaken the Security Council's role and
its significance." Id. at 53.
35. The delegate of India: "If I may say so with great respect and humility, what we
perhaps require even more than the revision of the Charter is a greater adherence to the spirit
of its provisions. That greater adherence comes about only by the resolving of the tensions
to which reference has been made, by a more sincere and prompt adherence to such decisions
as are made. The allegiance, the support and moral backing that the nations and the peoples
of the world give to the Charter are far more important than any kind of revision." Id. at 204.
36. Statements of Mr. Dulles, U.N. General Assembly Provisional Verbatim Rec., 10th
Sess., A/PV.518 (1955) and Mr. Molotov supra A/PV.518.
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ference not yet published, a complete index of all the documents of that
conference, a systematic and comprehensive study of the legislative history
of the Charter, taking into account their application by the various organs
of the United Nations and the interpretation to which they have given
rise? The Egyptian and Costa Rican proposal provided for the establishment of an advisory committee composed of fifteen Member States to
assist the Secretary-General in the preparation of the relevant documents
and prepare a questionnaire to circulate to the Member States to ascertain
their preliminary views as regards what they might deem appropriate for
the purpose of the general conference, to coordinate the views of these
Member States and to report to the General Assembly before June 1955S.
IV.

RELATION OF PREPARATORY WORK TO CHARTER REVIEW

During the discussions on the above resolutions which took place in the
Sixth (Legal) Committee, the relation between the proposals before the
Committee and the question of the Charter review, as provided under
paragraph 3 of Article 109, was considered at great length. The view was
expressed generally that preparations should be made now so that the
governments in 1955 would be in a position to reach a considered opinion
on the question of whether or not a general conference should be convened
to review the Charter. They felt that the provisions of Article 10 and of
paragraph I of Article 109 of the Charter were sufficiently broad to enable
the General Assembly to undertake such preparation3 0 Some delegations,
without committing themselves on the desirability of an actual revision of
the Charter, expressed themselves in favour of holding a general conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter. Other delegations went
further and asserted that the Charter needed a revision at the same time
recognizing that it could not be accomplished without approval of each of
the permanent members of the Security Council 0
Some delegations favoured a technical study but wished to avoid linking them at the present time to the question of reviewing the Charter.
They felt that Article 109 entrusted the task of reviewing the Charter to
a general conference and not to any of the existing organs of the United
Nations. Some delegations opposed the very idea of convening a conference pointing out that indirect attempts have been made to abolish
the unanimity rule and to undermine the basic principles of the Charter.
37. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess., Sixth Committee, 98 (Doc. No. A/C.6/L.
306/Rev. 2) (1953).
38. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess., Sixth Committee, 56 (Doc. No.
A/C.6/L.305) (1953).

39. The statements of the delegates of Belgium and the Netherlands; U.N. General
Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess, Sixth Committee, at 86, paras. 41,43 (1953).

40. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., Sth Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 70, at 14 (Doc.
No. A/2559) (1953).
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Any proposals made in anticipation of the revision of the Charter could
only increase international tension and might endanger the existence of
the United Nations. The delegations of the USSR and other EasternEuropean States held the view that it was contrary to the provisions of
Article 109 to make advance preparations for a possible revision of the
Charter. It was pointed out that nothing was said in Article 109 concerning such preparatory work. The delegations of Belgium and France shared
these objections to some extent. Similar constitutional objections were
raised with regard to the proposal to call for the submission of the preliminary views by governments as provided in the Egyptian resolution.
It was felt that the submission of preliminary views would lead to the
deprivation of the necessary indepenaence in discussions at the time of
the actual conference.
V.

REPERTORY OF PRACTICE UNDER THE CHARTER

In supporting the proposal regarding the preparation of the repertory
of practice of the United Nations under the Charter, several delegations
observed that such a repertory would assist governments in forming a
considered opinion about the desirability of convening the general conference under Article 109. In addition emphasis was laid on the intrinsic
value which would be derived in the determination whether the Charter
required review. Such a repertory would contribute to an understanding
of the Charter regardless of whether a general conference were convened
or not. The Secretariat was the only institution equipped to carry out
scientific and objective study.4 1 As to the actual presentation of the
repertory, the Secretary-General was given clear instructions by several
delegations. The Argentine Representative observed that the material
should be organized primarily in terms of the various articles of the
Charter so as to reveal their application and interpretation, rather than
be given a case-by-case treatment. 42 The Representative of Israel pointed
4
out that the repertory should be kept up-to-date by periodic supplements. A
A suggestion was made by the United States Representative that the repertory should be properly indexed. 44

VI.

RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS

Most of the delegations which have participated in the discussion on
the proposals to amend the Charter or to convene a review conference have
stated that under the provisions of Articles 108 and 109 no change could
be made in the present Charter without the approval of each of the perma41.
42.
43.
44.

U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Sess., Sixth Committee, at 59, para. 49 (19S3).
Id. at 86, para. 39.
Id. at 81, para. 47.
Id. at 63, para. 23.
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nent members of the Security Council.4 5 It is relevant to point out here
that a few delegations expressed a different view in the Interim Committee
of the Assembly to the effect that the Charter after being revised by a
general conference called for that purpose would become a new treaty
which would incorporate its own provisions on the method of its ratification. This new treaty would then come into force in accordance with those
provisions without regard for Articles 108 and 109 of the present Charter.
The Sixth Committee recommended a draft resolution, which was
approved by the Assembly, in which the Secretary-General was requested
to prepare, publish and circulate among the Member States, a systematic
compilation of the documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization not yet published, a complete index of all the documents of that Conference and a repertory on the practice of United
Nations organs appropriately indexed."
The great mass of the material to be presented has required the division
of the Repertory of Practice into five volumes. The first three volumes
covering the first 72 articles of the Charter have already been published
by the Secretary-General. 47 These volumes will cover all the articles of
the Charter in respect of which there have been decisions and discussions
by the organs of the United Nations from the period from which they
began functioning until September 1, 1954. The purpose of the repertory
as stated by the General Assembly was twofold, first to facilitate the consideration, at the tenth annual session, of the proposal to hold a general
conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter and secondly to contribute to the knowledge and
understanding of the Charter as it has been applied in practice by the
organs of the United Nations. In his preface to the first volume of the
repertory, the Secretary-General pointed out that both of these aims will
be served by the repertory.48 It constitutes a comprehensive summary
of the decisions of United Nations organs together with related material
organized by Charter Articles and presented in such a way as to throw
light on questions of application and interpretation of the Charter, which
have arisen in practice. Apart from achieving the stated objectives, these
volumes should prove useful to research students and teachers of International Law.
With the preparatory material above-described, the tenth session of
the Assembly will decide this year firstly whether or not to hold a review
conference and if so, when. Under the Charter, the decision to convene
45.
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a general conference could be made by the Assembly at its present session
by a majority vote of the Members of the General Assembly and by a
vote of any seven members of the Security Council. In this connection
the Secretary-General expressed the view that Article 109 (3) does not
preclude the General Assembly and the Security Council from taking a
decision in favour of a conference in accordance with the Article, but
leaving it to a later session to decide on the date of the conference. In
view of all the circumstances, valid arguments may be brought forward
for such a line of action, that is, for a decision at the tenth session of the
General Assembly in favour of a charter review conference, leaving open
for the time being, in the way just indicated, the question when the conference for that purpose should be convened. This view was so far
supported by the delegates of the United States, Ecuador, Brazil and
Dominican Republic and there appears to be general support from a
majority of the Member States for this proposal at this time.

